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ABSTRACT 
An effort to determine the feasibility of a software tool to 
assist in Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) has 
been completed.  This new and unique approach to 
FMEA uses model based systems engineering concepts 
to recommend failure modes, causes, and effects to the 
user after they have made several selections from pick 
lists about a component’s functions and inputs/outputs.  
Recommendations are made based on a library using 
common failure modes identified over the course of 
several major human spaceflight programs.  However, 
the tool could be adapted for use in a wide range of 
applications from NASA to the energy industry. 
INTRODUCTION 
In order for NASA to meet ambitious goals in space 
exploration using increasingly complex system designs, 
safety should be considered as early as possible in the 
design process. Program managers, design engineers, and 
systems safety and reliability practitioners recognize the 
need to identify risk early thus reducing lifecycle cost.   
by, However, current safety analysis methods are 
challenging to perform quickly enough to affect design, 
particularly when assessing  rapidly occurring changes 
and large, complex systems.   
This project investigated the feasibility of developing a 
software tool, or modifying an existing tool or suite of 
tools, to assist in Failure Modes and Effects Analysis 
(FMEA).  This innovative tool  uses a standardized 
systematic approach to failure analysis that makes it easy 
to capture model information while saving analysis time. 
This approach not only enables early risk mitigation by 
reducing cost and human error, but also produces a 
reusable system model. This model can  help bridge the 
gap between system engineering and safety.  Hardware 
criticality, which can drive cost and schedule due to 
testing and certification requirements, can be quickly and 
systematically identified.  Undesirable consequences 
across subsystem interfaces can be mitigated or 
eliminated.  
FMEA starts at the component level and evaluates what 
can go wrong, and how it can affect the system.  It is a 
bottom-up and systematic method that is mostly 
qualitative. It is used to identify design strategies to 
prevent failures and improve reliability.  The FMEA 
therefore provides input to risk assessment activities, 
assists in assessing compliance to safety requirements 
(e.g., identifying single point failures), and is used to 
compare the benefits of competing designs.  FMEAs are 
required for a wide range of products designed and built 
by NASA from Government Furnished Equipment 
projects and payloads, to fully integrated human rated 
spacecraft or habitats.  The energy industry could also 
benefit from mutual development and use of this tool.  
In prior NASA programs, it was recommended that lists 
of standard “common” failure modes (CFM) be 
considered for use, but free text fields provided for 
database entry led to inconsistent failure mode 
identification.  For example, to identify the mode where 
a valve “Fails to Close” some analysts would enter a 
failure mode of “Fails Open” while others wrote “Fails to 
Close”.  A later problem report search for occurrences of 
this failure mode would miss occurrences of the mode, as 
they were identified differently.  For this reason, more 
recent efforts have been to standardize a CFM list of 
about 100 selections for use in a database [1].  However, 
in practice it was observed that such a long list was 
unwieldy, and analysts often chose failure descriptions 
too general to be informative, such as “fails to function,” 
with the detailed description written in free form text.  
This negates the benefit of a CFM list.   
The FMEA Assistant tool has been designed to 
overcome this problem while retaining, and even 
expanding, the use of the common failure mode list. The 
FMEA Assistant does this by guiding the analyst through 
a set of questions about component attributes, including 
subsystem type, kinds of resources used, and types of 
outputs.  The chosen attributes narrows down the number 
of possible choices of failure modes that make sense for 
that component.   The analyst need only consider a few 
small sets from the full list of common failure modes to 
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find the appropriate ones.  The dialogue is dynamic, so 
that the choices of failure modes presented change if the 
analyst changes the attribute selections. The tool also 
extends the use of standardization by offering short lists 
of common failure causes and effects for each failure 
mode.  
The approach extends a prototype tool suite, the Hazard 
Identification Tool, developed in collaboration between 
Johnson Space Center’s Safety and Mission Assurance 
(S&MA) and Engineering directorates, which uses 
semantic text analysis and extraction technology to 
create system models from requirements, FMEAs and 
hazard reports [2]. The requirements and safety 
information are integrated into system architecture 
visualizations for review of completeness, correctness, 
and consistency of the analyses. This technology was 
extended to generate the basis of a reliability block 
diagram (RBD) model from the master equipment list 
(MEL). The model from the extracted text shows 
components, connections, redundancy, and links to 
FMEAs.  
This project addresses a recognized challenge in a 
FMEA competency that is needed for developing the 
analysis for human-rated spacecraft.  This project is also 
relevant to analysis of reliable systems being developed 
for power, life support, re-entry and landing, and 
software systems.  Early opportunities to design out 
failure modes prevent the need for re-design, and can 
save cost and schedule.   
1.  MODELING APPROACH 
A trade study to evaluate five existing software tools 
against the project’s objectives was completed.  The 
Hazard Identification Tool prototype was selected as a 
starting point. The FMEA Assistant tool models a 
system's components and their connective relationships, 
and then assists the design engineer or safety analyst 
(hereafter referred to as the user) in FMEA, and finally 
links the FMEA data back to the model for further 
analysis and review.  
The following describes in more detail the step-by-step 
procedures and how they were implemented. The 
component to follow in this example is a motor safety 
device. 
1.  An initial model is generated from the MEL with 
some manual manipulation.   
1.a. Information about component names and 
quantities are extracted from a MEL table for the 
system.  The user selects the components to include 
in the model and to have a FMEA worksheet. An 
example is provided in Figure 1.  
1.b. A model canvas, as shown in Figure 2, is 
automatically populated with the components, in the 
indicated quantities.  
1.c. Consulting the schematic, the user arranges the 
components and creates the connections to complete 
a model similar to an RBD, which reads left to right 
and shows parallel, redundant paths.   
Figure 3 shows the model after the components have 
been manually arranged and connected. Reachability 
analysis permits inspection of flow paths and redundancy 
from the visual model, as detailed in [2]. 
2.  The user selects a component to analyze from the 
visual model. The menu for initiating a FMEA dialogue 
for a component is shown in Figure 4.    
3. From pick lists on the dialogue page (shown in Figure 
5) the user selects the component features and functions, 
including: the system type, resources, outputs, state sets, 
and hazard types. Then, small sets of candidate failure 
modes are offered for user-selected functions, state sets 
and hazard types. Trying out alternate selections 
enhances analysis and decision-making.  The user has the 
option to deselect failure modes on this page or a 
subsequent dialogue page if some are redundant. For 
example, if “Inadvertent Output” and “Inadvertently 
Fires” are both offered for this device, the user can select 
the most specific wording that is correct. 
The Failure Mode Library was constructed using the 
Constellation CFM list, which has about 100 types of 
component failure modes. The Constellation CFM list 
includes phrases that relate to functional failures and 
input/output (I/O) failures. Examples include high input, 
incorrect timing, delayed activation, fails to actuate, 
degraded operations, fails to operate, fails to 
shutdown/stop, and opens incorrectly. The most common 
failures in the list describe a specific type of failure to 
function or function correctly. The CFM also contains 
failures to protect or control a hazard, which are 
commonly named for a hazardous state such as 
overvoltage. There are also input/output failures that 
describe lost or erroneous input or output, and these can 
also be interpreted as causes and effects of a failure.   
The library is in the form of a table of CFMs and some of 
their attributes, which is given in 
Appendix A.  Constellation Common Failure Modes. 
The format of the table is shown in Table 1. User choices 
 
 
 
of component attributes drive the selection of rows in the 
CFM library table that contain information for reuse in 
system modeling. 
 
 
Figure 1. MEL example, with column added to indicate 
which components are to be added to the system model  
Figure 2. Model canvas populated from MEL 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Model after manual arrangement of components and addition of connections 
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The user’s choice of the system type and other attributes 
determine the functional failures presented in the 
function pick list, which in turn determine the contents of 
the failure mode pick lists. 
Error! Reference source not found.Figure 6 shows a 
diagram indicating how the pick list choices offered as 
possible responses to dialogue queries depend on choices 
made for other queries, beginning with the choice of 
subsystem for the component. 
 
Table 1. Format of Table of Attributes associated with standard Common Failure Modes (Partial)
 
Figure 6. Diagram of Dialogue logic, illustrating how user responses determine offerings for queries 
 
2.   GENERATING THE PRELIMINARY FMEA  
After selecting the set of failure modes in the dialogue 
page as shown in of Figure 5, the user opens a second 
dialogue by clicking a button at the bottom of that first 
dialogue.  Here, the user can select types of failure mode 
causes and effects and can add descriptions and 
comments. An example of a completed second dialogue 
is shown in Figure 7, continuing with the motor safety 
component example. It contains a row for each failure 
mode selected in the first dialogue. Each failure mode 
“Description” on the far left can be extended with free 
form text to tailor the common failure mode with details 
specific to the particular component.  
 
         
         
         
Recommended FM List  Function  Operating States  Device Features  System Type 
Clogs  Transfer     Fluid  ECLSS, Thermal, Propulsion/Pyro 
Closes at incorrect time  Lock  Open, Locked  Control Operation  Mechanisms, Structures 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.  Second dialogue for refining and completing a component’s FMEAs
 
2.1 Selecting Causes and Effects 
 
By clicking on “Causes” and “Effects” columns in a 
failure mode row, the user then selects causes and effects 
from lists of common causes and common effects. The 
user has the opportunity to enter comments on the far 
right of each row for adding more detail concerning the 
selected causes and effects for the particular component.    
 
The “Causes” pick list is shown in . The field at the 
bottom allows the user to add a failure cause not on the 
pick list if there is a cause for the failure in the particular 
component that is not covered in the pick list. 
 
The causes pick list was developed by reviewing existing 
FMEAs and categorizing causes into these primary 
categories: Failure internal to component; 
Manufacturing, installation, or assembly error; Input 
problem; Excessive natural environment (e.g. radiation); 
and Excessive induced environment (e.g. vibration).  
 
Figure 8. Causes Pick List 
 
 
 
 
 
Similarly, the effects list includes: Failed or delayed 
function; Premature function; Loss of output; Premature 
output; Erroneous output; Damage; and Leakage.  The 
“Effects” pick list is shown in Figure 9. As with the 
Causes pick list, a field is provided that allows the user 
to select one or more failure effects and  enter a new one 
if there is an effect of the failure of the particular 
component that is not covered in the pick list. 
 
 
Figure 9.  Effects Pick List
 
 
2.2  Criticality and Redundancy 
 
The final fields that the user supplies in the dialogue of 
Figure 7 are criticality and redundancy for each failure 
mode.  The criticality is typically assigned on the basis of 
worst-case potential failure effect assuming the loss of 
all redundancy (where applicable) [1].  Criticalities are 
defined as: 
 
1 – Single failure that could result in loss of life or 
vehicle 
2 – Single failure that could result in a loss of mission 
1R# - Redundant hardware that, if all failed, could 
cause loss of life or vehicle.  A number (#) is used to 
indicate the number of failures required for complete 
system failure 
1S – Failure in a safety or hazard monitoring 
hardware item that could cause the system to fail to 
detect, combat, or operate when needed during a 
hazardous condition. 
2R – Redundant hardware item that if all failed, 
could cause a loss of mission. 
3 – All other failures.   
2.3  Generating a FMEA worksheet 
 
Finally, a FMEA worksheet, as shown in Figure 10, is 
generated in Excel, with the following fields: Subsystem, 
Component, Function, Failure Mode, Failure 
Description, Failure Causes, Immediate Effects, 
Criticality, and Comments.  
 
In addition to the FMEA worksheet, a table of the rows 
that have been selected from the Failure Modes attributes 
table during the analysis process can be output and 
reused for modeling system components in engineering.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Final FMEA Worksheet 
 
3.  CONCLUSION 
 
The prototype FMEA Assistant tool has the potential to 
reduce cost and human error.  It provides a standardized 
systematic approach to failure analysis while gathering 
model information.  Without any tool, the user may 
repeatedly choose general failure modes such as “failure 
to function”.  General failure modes are rarely adequate 
for FMEA worksheet development and subsequent 
systems and safety analysis.  The tool helps drive out the 
complete and most descriptive choices of applicable 
common failure modes.  With the FMEA Assistant tool, 
the user is invited to consider the component from 
several perspectives (subsystem, function, inputs, 
outputs, operating states, and hazard types).  This 
encourages full consideration of potential failure modes 
and therefore more thorough and accurate analysis.  The 
user is able to spend more time considering safety-
related issues and less time repeatedly scanning a long 
list of common failure modes or searching for related 
historical or other information.  This should result in a 
lower error rate, less overall time preparing the FMEA, 
and an improved product.  Furthermore, this approach 
not only enables early risk mitigation, but also model 
reuse.  Using the tool to derive a single model for reuse 
by systems engineers, safety analysts, and others helps 
reduce cost and human error.  Identifying single point 
failures allows for early opportunities to design them out, 
preventing the need for re-design, and can save cost and 
schedule.   
 
4.  FORWARD WORK 
 
In response to feedback from potential users, a capability 
to identify hazards associated with particular failure 
modes has recently been added.  This capability was 
developed by mapping the common failure modes list 
with a common or standard hazards list.  This helps the 
analyst either identify hazards at the vehicle level caused 
by the component, or can help with the currently manual 
task of cross-referencing the FMEA to hazards already 
documented.   
 
Also in response to user suggestions, a selection of 
common components will be selected for identification 
of standard failure modes.  This will demonstrate the 
concept of building a library of standard components 
with failure modes, causes, and effects already identified 
within the tool. Additionally, integration with the 
existing FMEA database used by the International Space 
Station Program has been studied and is feasible with the 
 
 
 
proper data field mapping and funding to complete the 
task. 
 
Evaluation of the benefit in time, accuracy and 
specificity compared to traditional FMEA practices is 
greatly desired. A relatively small scope NASA project 
would be ideal for an evaluation.   
 
In the longer term, the FMEA Assistant tool capability 
could be integrated with other vehicle risk assessment 
tools in development at JSC for quantitative reliability 
assessment.  It could also tie into other JSC model-based 
system and mission capability impact tools currently in 
development, as they all have the same goals of 
providing information on how a failure affects other 
systems, and how the effects propagate to affect the 
mission. Along those lines, the tool could be used in 
operational programs to help identify the potential 
cause(s) of a failure.  
 
A recent effort [3] to integrate safety attributes and 
failure knowledge from FMEA Assistant into Systems 
Modeling Language (SysML) models has been initiated. 
This is another related area of potential forward work.   
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Appendix A.  Constellation Common Failure Modes Attributes Table (Partial) 
Recommended FM List  Function  Operating States  Device Features  System Type 
Clogs  Transfer     Fluid  ECLSS, Thermal, Propulsion/Pyro 
Closes at incorrect time  Lock  Open, Locked  Control Operation  Mechanisms, Structures 
Closes at incorrect time  Close  Open, Closed  Control Path 
ECLSS, Thermal, 
Propulsion/Pyro, Power/Energy 
Closes at incorrect time 
Regulate 
Timing  Open, Closed  Control Path 
ECLSS, Thermal, 
Propulsion/Pyro, Power/Energy 
Closes incorrectly  Close  Open, Closed  Control Path 
ECLSS, Thermal, 
Propulsion/Pyro, Power/Energy 
Combustion instability 
Control 
Vibration     Propulsion/Pyro  Propulsion/Pyro 
Degraded Operations  Operate  Off, Operating  Control Operation  Any 
Delayed activation  Activate  Inactive, Active  Control Operation  Any 
Delayed activation 
Regulate 
Timing  Inactive, Active  Control Operation  Any 
Delayed de‐activation  De‐activate  Active, Inactive  Control Operation  Any 
Delayed de‐activation 
Regulate 
Timing  Active, Inactive  Control Operation  Any 
 
 
 
Delayed operation  Operate  Off, Operating  Control Operation  Any 
Delayed operation 
Regulate 
Timing  Off, Operating  Control Operation  Any 
Electrostatic discharge  Insulate     Electronics/Power  Power/Energy, Electronics 
Erroneous high indication  Indicate     Sensor/Indicator  Any‐with Sensor/Indicator 
Erroneous indication  Indicate     Sensor/Indicator  Any‐with Sensor/Indicator 
Erroneous Input  Receive Input     Sensor/Indicator  Any‐with Sensor/Indicator 
Erroneous low indication  Indicate     Sensor/Indicator  Any‐with Sensor/Indicator 
Erroneous output  Supply Output     Sensor/Indicator  Any‐with Sensor/Indicator 
Erroneous position indication  Indicate     Sensor/Indicator  Any‐with Sensor/Indicator 
Erroneous trip 
Trip; Control 
Overcurrent  Closed, Open  Electronics/Power  Power/Energy, Electronics 
External leakage  Contain/Isolate     Fluid  ECLSS, Thermal, Propulsion/Pyro 
Fails activated  De‐activate  Active, Inactive  Control Operation  Any 
Fails deactivated  Activate  Inactive, Active  Control Operation  Any 
Fails high  Monitor     Sensor/Indicator  Any‐with Sensor/Indicator 
Fails low  Monitor     Sensor/Indicator  Any‐with Sensor/Indicator 
Fails off  De‐activate  Off, On  Control Operation  Any 
Fails off  Monitor  Off, Monitor  Sensor/Indicator  Any‐with Sensor/Indicator 
Fails on  Activate  On, Off   Control Operation  Any 
Fails partially closed  Close  Open, Closed  Control Path 
ECLSS, Thermal, 
Propulsion/Pyro, Power/Energy 
Fails partially open  Open  Closed, Open  Control Path 
ECLSS, Thermal, 
Propulsion/Pyro, Power/Energy 
Fails to actuate  Actuate  Off, Actuated  Control Operation  Any 
Fails to close  Lock  Open, Locked  Control Operation  Mechanisms, Structures 
Fails to close  Close  Open, Closed  Control Path 
ECLSS, Thermal, 
Propulsion/Pyro, Power/Energy 
Fails to cut  Cut     Motion/Separation 
GN&C, Propulsion/Pyro, 
Mechanisms, Robotics 
Fails to deploy  Deploy     Motion/Separation 
GN&C, Propulsion/Pyro, 
Mechanisms, Robotics 
Fails to detect  Detect     Sensor/Indicator  Any‐with Sensor/Indicator 
Fails to fire  Fire  Off, Fired  Propulsion/Pyro  Propulsion/Pyro 
Fails to function 
… other 
function          
Fails to ignite  Ignite  Off, Ignited  Propulsion/Pyro  Propulsion/Pyro 
Fails to inflate  Inflate     Motion/Separation 
GN&C, Propulsion/Pyro, 
Mechanisms, Robotics 
Fails to initiate  Initiate  Off, Initiated  Propulsion/Pyro  Propulsion/Pyro 
Fails to jettison  Jettison     Motion/Separation 
GN&C, Propulsion/Pyro, 
Mechanisms, Robotics 
Fails to mate  Mate  Mated, Separated  Motion/Separation  GN&C, Propulsion/Pyro, 
 
 
 
Mechanisms, Robotics
Fails to open  Open  Closed, Open  Control Path 
ECLSS, Thermal, 
Propulsion/Pyro, Power/Energy 
Fails to operate  Operate  Off, Operating  Control Operation  Any 
Fails to reef  Reef     Motion/Separation 
GN&C, Propulsion/Pyro, 
Mechanisms, Robotics 
Fails to relieve  Relieve     Fluid  ECLSS, Thermal, Propulsion/Pyro 
Fails to rotate  Rotate  Off, Rotated  Motion/Separation 
GN&C, Propulsion/Pyro, 
Mechanisms, Robotics 
Fails to run  Run  Off, Running  Control Operation  Any 
Fails to seal  Seal     Fluid  ECLSS, Thermal, Propulsion/Pyro 
Fails to separate  Separate  Mated, Separated  Motion/Separation 
GN&C, Propulsion/Pyro, 
Mechanisms, Robotics 
Fails to shutdown/stop  Shutdown/stop  Started, Stopped  Control Operation  Any 
Fails to stop  Stop  Started, Stopped  Control Operation  Any 
Fails to switch  Switch  Closed, Open  Electronics/Power 
ECLSS, Thermal, 
Propulsion/Pyro, Power/Energy 
Fails to switch  Switch  Off, On  Electronics/Power  Any 
Fails to switch  Switch  On, Off   Electronics/Power  Any 
Fails to switch  Switch  3_or_More_States  Electronics/Power  Any 
Fails to transfer  Transfer     I/O   
ECLSS, Propulsion/Pyro, C&DH, 
C&T, GN&C, Power/Energy, 
Thermal 
Fails to trip 
Trip; Control 
Overcurrent  Closed, Open  Electronics/Power  Power/Energy, Electronics 
Flow blockage  Transfer     Fluid  ECLSS, Thermal, Propulsion/Pyro 
Flow restriction  Transfer     Fluid  ECLSS, Thermal, Propulsion/Pyro 
High input  Receive Input     Control Amount 
ECLSS, Thermal, 
Propulsion/Pyro, C&DH, C&T, 
GN&C, Power/Energy, 
Mechanisms 
High output  Supply Output     Control Amount 
ECLSS, Thermal, 
Propulsion/Pyro, C&DH, C&T, 
GN&C, Power/Energy, 
Mechanisms 
Inadvertant output  Supply Output     I/O   
ECLSS, Thermal, 
Propulsion/Pyro, C&DH, C&T, 
GN&C, Power/Energy, 
Mechanisms 
Inadvertant output 
Regulate 
Timing     I/O   
ECLSS, Thermal, 
Propulsion/Pyro, C&DH, C&T, 
GN&C, Power/Energy, 
Mechanisms 
Inadvertantly fires  Fire  Off, Fired  Propulsion/Pyro  Propulsion/Pyro 
Inadvertantly fires 
Regulate 
Timing  Off, Fired  Propulsion/Pyro  Propulsion/Pyro 
 
 
 
Incorrect timing 
Regulate 
Timing     Control Operation  Any 
Internal leakage  Contain/Isolate     Fluid  ECLSS, Thermal, Propulsion/Pyro 
Loss of adhesion‐cohesion  Attach     Structure  Any 
Loss of input ‐ 
data/cmd/signal  Receive Input     I/O   
ECLSS, Propulsion/Pyro, C&DH, 
C&T, GN&C, Power/Energy 
Loss of input ‐ general  Receive Input     I/O   
ECLSS, Propulsion/Pyro, C&DH, 
C&T, GN&C, Power/Energy 
Loss of input ‐ power  Receive Input     I/O   
ECLSS, Propulsion/Pyro, C&DH, 
C&T, GN&C, Power/Energy 
Loss of insulation capability  Insulate     Thermal  Any 
Loss of output ‐ 
data/cmd/signal   Supply Output     I/O   
ECLSS, Propulsion/Pyro, C&DH, 
C&T, GN&C, Power/Energy 
Loss of output ‐ general  Supply Output     I/O   
ECLSS, Propulsion/Pyro, C&DH, 
C&T, GN&C, Power/Energy 
Loss of output ‐ power   Supply Output     I/O   
ECLSS, Propulsion/Pyro, C&DH, 
C&T, GN&C, Power/Energy 
Loss of preload/loading  Attach     Structure  Any 
Low input  Receive Input     Control Amount 
ECLSS, Thermal, 
Propulsion/Pyro, C&DH, C&T, 
GN&C, Power/Energy, 
Mechanisms 
Low output  Supply Output     Control Amount 
ECLSS, Thermal, 
Propulsion/Pyro, C&DH, C&T, 
GN&C, Power/Energy, 
Mechanisms 
No indication  Indicate     Sensor/Indicator  Any‐with Sensor/Indicator 
Nonconforming flow  Control Flow     Fluid  ECLSS, Thermal, Propulsion/Pyro 
Nonconforming start  Start  Stopped, Started  Control Operation  Any 
Nonconforming stop  Stop  Started, Stopped  Control Operation  Any 
Open circuit  Protect Circuit     Electronics/Power  Power/Energy, Electronics 
Opens at incorrect time  Open  Closed, Open  Control Path 
ECLSS, Thermal, 
Propulsion/Pyro, Power/Energy 
Opens at incorrect time 
Regulate 
Timing  Closed, Open  Control Path 
ECLSS, Thermal, 
Propulsion/Pyro, Power/Energy 
Opens incorrectly  Open  Closed, Open  Control Path 
ECLSS, Thermal, 
Propulsion/Pyro, Power/Energy 
Overcurrent 
Control 
Overcurrent     Electronics/Power  Power/Energy, Electronics 
Overheats  Control Heat     Thermal  Any 
Parameter drift  Condition Data     Sensor/Indicator  Any‐with Sensor/Indicator 
Passes contaminates 
Control 
Contaminants     Fluid  ECLSS, Thermal, Propulsion/Pyro 
Premature actuation  Actuate  Off, Actuated  Control Operation  Any 
Premature actuation  Regulate  Off, Actuated  Control Operation  Any 
 
 
 
Timing 
Premature de‐activation  De‐Activate  Active, Inactive  Control Operation  Any 
Premature de‐activation 
Regulate 
Timing  Active, Inactive  Control Operation  Any 
Premature operation  Operate/Run  Off, Operating  Control Operation  Any 
Premature operation 
Regulate 
Timing  Off, Operating  Control Operation  Any 
Regulates high  Regulate     Control Amount 
ECLSS, Thermal, 
Propulsion/Pyro, C&DH, C&T, 
GN&C, Power/Energy, 
Mechanisms 
Regulates low  Regulate     Control Amount 
ECLSS, Thermal, 
Propulsion/Pyro, C&DH, C&T, 
GN&C, Power/Energy, 
Mechanisms 
Reverse polarity  Protect Circuit     Electronics/Power  Power/Energy, Electronics 
Separates prematurely  Separate  Mated, Separated  Motion/Separation 
GN&C, Propulsion/Pyro, 
Mechanisms, Robotics 
Separates prematurely 
Regulate 
Timing  Mated, Separated  Motion/Separation 
GN&C, Propulsion/Pyro, 
Mechanisms, Robotics 
Short circuit 
Control 
Overcurrent     Electronics/Power  Power/Energy, Electronics 
Short to ground 
Control 
Overcurrent     Electronics/Power  Power/Energy, Electronics 
Structural failure ‐ debond  Attach     Structure  Any 
Structural failure ‐ debris  Contain/Isolate     Structure  Any 
Structural failure ‐ deform 
Protect 
Structure     Structure  Any 
Structural failure ‐ fracture 
Protect 
Structure     Structure  Any 
Structural failure ‐ general 
Protect 
Structure     Structure  Any 
Structural failure ‐ loss of 
containment  Contain/Isolate     Structure  Any 
Structural failure ‐ mounting  Attach     Structure  Any 
 
